News for May 22 and 30, 2026: Improper Enhancements, Double Jeopardy Violations, and Ineffective Counsel

This week’s newsletter covers several favorable federal court decisions and developments affecting sentencing, convictions, and post-conviction relief. As always, the goal is to keep readers informed about important legal rulings that may impact ongoing cases, appeals, and future challenges in federal court.

United States v. Roman, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106505 (N.D. Ga. May 14, 2026)

Court Grants § 2255 Relief After Counsel Failed to Ensure Concurrent Sentence Was Imposed

The district court granted Charles Roman’s § 2255 motion after finding that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to ensure that Roman’s federal sentence ran concurrently with his state sentence as required by the plea agreement. Roman’s plea agreement specifically provided that the parties would recommend a 180-month sentence “to run concurrent with [his] state custodial sentence,” but at sentencing neither counsel nor the government informed the court about that provision, and the written judgment omitted any concurrency language. As a result, Roman’s federal sentence was treated as consecutive, substantially increasing the amount of time he would serve in prison. The court found counsel’s failure to alert the sentencing judge to the concurrency provision was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial because there was a reasonable probability the court would have imposed the sentence as agreed had counsel raised the issue. To correct the error, the district court vacated the original judgment and reimposed the same 180-month sentence with the explicit specification that it run concurrently with Roman’s state sentence.

---

United States v. Scott, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 14745 (4th Cir. May 22, 2026)

Virginia “Use or Display of Firearm During Robbery” Offense Is Not a Crime of Violence Under the Guidelines

The Fourth Circuit vacated Raquan Scott’s sentence after holding that a Virginia conviction for use or display of a firearm during the commission of a robbery under Va. Code § 18.2-53.1 does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court had applied a higher base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 based on Scott’s prior Virginia firearm conviction, but the Fourth Circuit held that the offense does not categorically require the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” as required under the Guidelines’ elements clause. The court explained that Virginia robbery itself is broader than generic robbery because it can be committed through threats unrelated to physical force, including threats to accuse someone of sodomy, and the firearm statute does not require that the firearm actually be used against another person or used to overcome the victim’s resistance. Applying the categorical approach, the court emphasized that the focus must remain on the statutory elements, not how the crime is usually committed in real life. Because the enhancement improperly increased Scott’s advisory guideline range from 15-21 months to 30-37 months, the Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing without the enhancement.

---

United States v. Williams, 172 F.4th 791 (9th Cir. 2026)

Court Vacates Sentence Because Judge Improperly Applied Obstruction Enhancement Without Required Perjury Findings

The Ninth Circuit vacated Koby Williams’s sentence after holding that the district court improperly imposed a two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 without making the required findings that Williams committed willful perjury. The government argued that Williams lied during trial when he testified that he never intended to engage in sex acts with a minor, that he saw a different online advertisement than the one used by law enforcement, and that he never believed the undercover officer posing as “Rebecca” was actually thirteen years old. But simply rejecting a defendant’s testimony is not enough to support an obstruction enhancement. The Ninth Circuit explained that before imposing the enhancement, the court was required to independently review the testimony and specifically find that the statements were false, material, and intentionally made to obstruct justice. Instead, the district court merely adopted the PSR without making any explicit findings regarding falsity, materiality, or willful intent to lie under oath. Because the Supreme Court’s decision in Dunnigan requires detailed findings before a defendant’s testimony can be treated as perjury for sentencing purposes, the Ninth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing without the unsupported enhancement.

---

United States v. Pimental, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 14457 (1st Cir. May 20, 2026)

Massachusetts Carjacking Is Not a Crime of Violence Under Career Offender Guideline

The First Circuit vacated Richard Pimental’s sentence after holding that Massachusetts carjacking is not categorically a “crime of violence” under the career offender guideline. The district court had treated the conviction as a qualifying predicate offense under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, which nearly doubled Pimental’s guideline range, but the First Circuit explained that the statute sweeps more broadly than the Guidelines’ force clause. Applying the categorical approach, the court focused on the least serious conduct covered by the statute and found that Massachusetts carjacking can be committed through an “assault” that involves only offensive touching rather than violent physical force capable of causing pain or injury. The court rejected the government’s argument that carjacking is inherently violent, emphasizing that courts must examine the statutory elements themselves, not how the crime is usually committed in real life. Unlike statutes requiring murderous intent or the use of a dangerous weapon, Massachusetts carjacking only requires intent to steal a vehicle, which does not necessarily involve violent force. Because at least one method of committing the offense fell outside the Guidelines’ definition of a crime of violence, the First Circuit held that the offense could not support the career offender enhancement and remanded for resentencing without the enhancement.

---

Serrano-Delgado v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108494 (D.P.R. May 15, 2026)

Court Grants § 2255 Relief Because Defendant Could Not Be Punished Twice for the Same Conduct

The district court granted § 2255 relief after finding that Cristian Serrano-Delgado’s convictions under both 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 924(j) violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because both convictions were based on the same underlying conduct during a Hobbs Act robbery that resulted in a death. Although the court rejected Serrano’s argument under United States v. Taylor because the completed Hobbs Act robbery remained a valid crime of violence, the court held that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Barrett v. United States barred separate convictions and punishments under both statutes for the same firearm conduct. The court explained that a § 924(j) offense necessarily includes a § 924(c) offense because § 924(j) merely increases the punishment when a death results from the same firearm violation. Applying Barrett retroactively on collateral review, the court concluded that Serrano could not legally receive two convictions for what amounted to the same offense. The court therefore vacated Serrano’s § 924(j) conviction and sentence

---

United States v. Sayles, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107603 (N.D. Iowa May 15, 2026)

Court Reduces Sentence Under Amendment 821 After Elimination of “Status Points”

The district court granted Terrance Sayles a sentence reduction under retroactive Guideline Amendment 821, which changed how “status points” are calculated in a defendant’s criminal history score. Under the old guideline, defendants automatically received two extra criminal history points if they committed the federal offense while on probation, parole, supervised release, or another criminal justice sentence. Amendment 821 largely eliminated those extra points for lower criminal history defendants because the Sentencing Commission concluded the rule overstated criminal history in many cases. Sayles originally received two status points, which increased his criminal history category from II to III and raised his guideline range from 51-63 months to 57-71 months. After applying Amendment 821 retroactively, the court removed those points, lowered Sayles’ criminal history category back to II, and reduced his sentence from 57 months to 51 months, the bottom of the new guideline range.

United States v. Revels, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 15065 (4th Cir. May 27, 2026)

Fourth Circuit Vacates Sentence After District Court Applied Enhancement Without Required Findings

The Fourth Circuit vacated Jonathan Revels’ sentence after finding that the district court improperly applied a homicide cross-reference enhancement without making the factual findings required by the Sentencing Guidelines. The enhancement increased Revels’ offense level from 14 to 29 based on a finding that a firearm involved in his felon-in-possession case was used in connection with a voluntary manslaughter offense. The problem was that Revels possessed three different firearms, and the district court never identified which firearm supported the enhancement or explained why the required guideline standard was satisfied. The revolver used in the shooting could not support the enhancement because it was not part of the offense of conviction, while the two shotguns listed in the indictment were never tied by specific findings to the homicide. The Fourth Circuit emphasized that “whether the district court could have made a finding that would have survived appellate review is different from whether the court actually made that finding.” Because appellate courts cannot assume facts the sentencing judge never found, and because the record suggested the court may have relied on a legally impermissible theory, the sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing. The court also noted additional concerns with the sentencing proceeding, including the lack of a clear guideline calculation, inadequate explanation of the sentence imposed, and questions about whether the district court properly addressed the defendant’s sentencing arguments.

Download the free guide, Insider’s Guide to Using Habeas Corpus to Get Out of Prison, for a practical overview of how habeas corpus works and why many post-conviction filings fail.

First Name:

Email address:

Leave this field empty if you're human:

Two Big Supreme Court Cases That Affect Compassionate Release

Two Supreme Court decisions issued on May 28, 2026, will significantly impact compassionate release litigation: Rutherford v. United States, 608 U.S. ___ (2026), and Fernandez v. United States, 608 U.S. ___ (2026). These cases didn’t kill compassionate release. What they did was eliminate some arguments while leaving others available, which means litigants will need to be more careful how they make their arguments for relief.

In Rutherford, the Supreme Court held that courts generally cannot use compassionate release to reduce a sentence simply because the law has changed and the defendant would receive a lower sentence if sentenced today. This issue commonly arose in cases involving old § 924(c) stacking provisions, § 851 enhancements, and other sentencing laws that Congress later changed without making those changes retroactive. For several years, some courts treated these sentencing disparities as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for relief. The Supreme Court rejected that approach, concluding that courts cannot use compassionate release to effectively make non-retroactive changes in law retroactive.

The same day, the Court decided Fernandez v. United States, 608 U.S. ___ (2026). There, the inmate argued that serious doubts about the validity of his conviction justified compassionate release. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that compassionate release cannot be used as a substitute for habeas corpus or a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. If the argument is that the conviction itself is unlawful, the proper vehicle remains the normal post-conviction process. According to the Court, compassionate release is designed to address extraordinary circumstances, not to relitigate the legal validity of a sentence or conviction.

These decisions narrow compassionate release, but they do not eliminate it. Many people are focusing on what the Court rejected while overlooking what remains available. Compassionate release still involves two separate steps. First, the inmate must establish extraordinary and compelling reasons. Second, the court must evaluate the sentencing factors found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Supreme Court primarily limited the first step. It did not eliminate the importance of sentencing disparities during the second.

That distinction may become critically important. The Sentencing Commission’s policy statement found at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5) permits relief based on circumstances that are “similar in gravity” to the extraordinary and compelling reasons specifically identified elsewhere in the guideline. Notice what the guideline says. It does not require identical circumstances. It requires circumstances that are similar in gravity. Gravity means seriousness, weight, or significance. It doesn’t mean they need to be exactly the same as those criteria in (b)(1)-(4). The Commission intentionally chose broad language that allows courts to evaluate unusual situations that may not fit neatly into one of the listed categories.

As a result, future compassionate release litigation may focus more heavily on demonstrating extraordinary hardships that qualify under § 1B1.13(b)(5), such as severe medical neglect, unusually harsh prison conditions, serious health issues, prolonged isolation, or other extraordinary circumstances comparable in seriousness to the examples specifically listed in the guideline. Once extraordinary and compelling reasons are established, sentencing disparities may still play an important role during the court’s § 3553(a) analysis. An inmate may still argue that a sentence is far longer than what would be imposed today. The difference is that the disparity may no longer serve as the extraordinary and compelling reason itself. Instead, it becomes part of the broader analysis regarding whether continued imprisonment remains appropriate.

The battlefield has changed, but compassionate release remains available. Inmates who rely solely on non-retroactive sentencing changes or attacks on the validity of their convictions will likely face denial after Rutherford and Fernandez. Those who develop stronger arguments under § 1B1.13(b)(5), while using modern sentencing disparities as part of the § 3553(a) analysis, may continue to find opportunities for relief despite these decisions.

BOP NEWS:

The BOP dropped a bunch of new and revised program statements this week. I was invited to a Zoom meeting with former BOP admin staffers and others to express my views of one notable program statement, Lockdowns and Modified Operations. In short, the new 10-page policy attempts to reduce the use of lockdowns and imposes new accountability steps for BOP staff overall. If the BOP institutions follow this new policy, it could reduce lockdowns and modified operations. Don’t hold your breath.