Supreme Court Lets Ruling Overturning Federal Gun Conviction Stand

The U.S. Supreme Court has denied the government’s request to review a Fifth Circuit decision overturning a federal felon-in-possession conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The decision leaves an important Second Amendment victory in place and strengthens the growing body of Fifth Circuit precedent recognizing that not every felony conviction justifies permanently stripping someone of the right to possess a firearm.

The development is particularly important for defendants in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi, where the Fifth Circuit has increasingly required the government to justify firearm prohibitions based on the nature of a person’s prior conviction rather than simply relying on the fact that the conviction was classified as a felony. Combined with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Hemani and the Fifth Circuit’s decision to rehear United States v. Squire, these developments could create new opportunities for people facing federal firearm charges and some who have already been convicted.

Hembree: Why a Prior Drug Possession Conviction Was Not Enough

In United States v. Hembree, 165 F.4th 909 (5th Cir. 2026), the Fifth Circuit applied the Second Amendment’s history-and-tradition framework to a prosecution under § 922(g)(1), the federal law prohibiting firearm possession by people previously convicted of crimes punishable by more than one year in prison.

The critical issue was whether Hembree’s prior drug possession conviction provided a constitutionally sufficient reason to prohibit him from possessing a firearm. The Fifth Circuit’s approach recognizes that a felony label alone does not establish that someone belongs to a category of people who historically could be disarmed. That distinction matters because federal firearm prosecutions have traditionally treated almost any qualifying felony conviction as sufficient, without requiring the government to demonstrate why that particular offense justified the loss of Second Amendment rights.

The Fifth Circuit’s analysis follows New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), which requires the government to justify firearm restrictions by reference to the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. In cases involving nonviolent offenses, that inquiry can be especially important. The government cannot simply assume that conduct is historically associated with dangerousness because Congress or a state legislature classified it as a felony.

The Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari leaves Hembree’s favorable appellate judgment undisturbed. However, the Supreme Court has not declared § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional for nonviolent felons nationwide. But it has declined to disturb a ruling that did exactly that as applied to a defendant whose only predicate felony was simple drug possession.

How the Supreme Court’s Hemani Decision Strengthens the Argument

The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Hemani, 146 S. Ct. 1677 (2026), provides another important piece of this developing area of law. In that case, the government prosecuted a Texas man under § 922(g)(3) because he admitted using marijuana approximately every other day while possessing a firearm in his home.

The Supreme Court held that the prosecution violated the Second Amendment. The government had attempted to justify the prohibition by comparing unlawful drug users to people historically classified as habitual drunkards. But the Court found important differences between the historical regulations and the government’s interpretation of § 922(g)(3). Historical restrictions generally concerned people whose intoxication seriously impaired their ability to function, and many involved individualized proceedings before liberty could be restricted. The government’s proposed rule, by contrast, would automatically disarm people based on unlawful drug use without requiring comparable proof of impairment or dangerousness.

The Court expressly limited its decision. It did not decide whether Congress could disarm people who are presently intoxicated, addicted to drugs, or individually shown to be dangerous. Nor did it resolve the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1), the felon-in-possession statute involved in Hembree.

Nevertheless, Hemani reinforces a principle relevant to Hembree: the government must establish a meaningful historical justification for restricting Second Amendment rights. The two decisions address different statutory provisions, but both require courts to look beyond broad assumptions about drug-related conduct.

Squire: The Fifth Circuit Is Now Considering a Much Broader Challenge

Another development could have consequences extending well beyond defendants with nonviolent felony convictions.

In United States v. Squire, 177 F.4th 614 (5th Cir. 2026), a Fifth Circuit panel initially upheld a § 922(g)(1) conviction involving a defendant with prior drug-trafficking and other felony convictions. The panel concluded that the historical tradition of disarming dangerous individuals supported applying the statute to someone with Squire’s criminal history.

On July 20, 2026, however, the Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and vacated that panel opinion. United States v. Squire, 182 F.4th 481 (5th Cir. 2026). That means the original panel decision is no longer binding precedent, and the full court will reconsider the case.

What makes the rehearing particularly significant is the constitutional question now receiving attention. Rather than focusing solely on whether Squire’s prior convictions justified disarmament under the Second Amendment, the case raises the possibility of challenging Congress’s authority to enact § 922(g)(1) under the Commerce Clause.

Justice Thomas raised related concerns in his separate concurrence in Hemani, suggesting that lower courts should reexamine the constitutional foundation of § 922(g). Judge Stephen Higginson’s dissent from the decision to rehear Squire specifically identified that concurrence and warned that the en banc proceedings could lead to a major reconsideration of federal firearms law.

The Commerce Clause argument is fundamentally different from the Second Amendment challenges in Hembree and Hemani. It questions whether Congress has sufficient constitutional authority to regulate firearm possession merely because a firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

Existing Supreme Court and circuit precedent has generally permitted prosecutions under § 922(g) when the firearm crossed state lines at some point. Squire’s challenge could require the Fifth Circuit to reconsider that longstanding interpretation. The court has not yet decided the merits of the issue, and the grant of rehearing should not be mistaken for a ruling that the statute is unconstitutional.

What These Developments Mean for People Facing § 922(g) Charges

For defendants currently facing § 922(g)(1) charges in the Fifth Circuit, Hembree and related decisions make the nature of the prior felony conviction particularly important. A person whose firearm prohibition rests on a nonviolent drug possession conviction may have a substantially different constitutional argument from someone whose prior convictions involve violent conduct, drug trafficking, or other offenses historically associated with dangerousness.

Defense attorneys should examine the precise predicate convictions, the applicable Fifth Circuit precedent, and whether an individualized Second Amendment challenge is available. Those arguments should be raised and preserved during the criminal proceedings, particularly because appellate courts apply different standards when constitutional objections were not properly presented in the district court.

For defendants charged under § 922(g)(3), Hemani provides direct Supreme Court authority against prosecutions based solely on unlawful drug use in circumstances comparable to that case. It does not invalidate every prosecution involving drugs and firearms, but it substantially limits the government’s ability to rely on drug-use status alone.

The pending Squire rehearing presents another possible avenue. If the Fifth Circuit adopts a narrower interpretation of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, the consequences could reach defendants whose criminal histories would otherwise justify disarmament under existing Second Amendment precedent. Whether that happens remains uncertain.

What About People Already Serving Federal Prison Sentences?

People already convicted under § 922(g) should also examine these developments, but the availability of postconviction relief is more complicated.

A defendant whose direct appeal remains pending may be able to invoke favorable controlling precedent. Someone whose conviction is already final ordinarily must consider a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, including the one-year limitations period, procedural-default rules, and restrictions on second or successive motions.

Importantly, a new constitutional decision does not automatically authorize a second or successive § 2255 motion. Under § 2255(h)(2), the applicable rule must have been made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. Neither a favorable Fifth Circuit decision nor the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari satisfies that requirement.

The procedural history matters just as much as the underlying constitutional argument. Someone who has never filed a § 2255 motion may face different obstacles from someone whose first motion has already been denied. Likewise, a person whose conviction is still on direct review occupies a different position from someone seeking to reopen a judgment that became final years ago.

That is why these cases should be evaluated individually rather than treated as automatic grounds for release.

Why the Fifth Circuit Is Worth Watching

The Fifth Circuit has become an important forum for litigation over the constitutional limits of federal firearm prohibitions. Its decisions involving nonviolent felony convictions have demonstrated that the government cannot always rely on a person’s criminal record without examining the historical justification for disarmament.

Hembree represents an important victory for defendants challenging § 922(g)(1) based on prior drug possession convictions. The Supreme Court’s refusal to review that judgment leaves the favorable Fifth Circuit ruling in place. Hemani adds binding Supreme Court authority limiting the government’s ability to disarm people based solely on unlawful drug use, while Squire presents the possibility of a much broader challenge to the federal government’s power to regulate firearm possession.

These developments do not mean that § 922(g) has been struck down or that everyone convicted under the statute is entitled to relief. They do mean that constitutional arguments previously considered unlikely to succeed are receiving serious consideration, particularly within the Fifth Circuit.