Pennsylvania Purse-Snatching Robbery Does Not Qualify as Crime of Violence for Federal Sentencing Enhancement

A prior conviction labeled “robbery” does not automatically qualify as a crime of violence under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. The elements of the state offense must satisfy the federal definition. In United States v. White, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 34481 (3d Cir. Nov. 6, 2026), that distinction required the Third Circuit to vacate a federal firearm sentence.

The court held that Pennsylvania’s third-degree felony robbery offense sweeps more broadly than generic robbery because it covers snatching property without overcoming any resistance from the victim. Generic robbery requires more: when the taking rests on physical force, that force must overcome the victim’s resistance.

The decision explains an important limit on federal sentencing enhancements— and why even an offense expressly called robbery under state law may fail to qualify.

How the Robbery Conviction Increased White’s Sentencing Range

White pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the parties disputed whether his prior Pennsylvania third-degree felony robbery conviction qualified as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.

That classification mattered because U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1) imposed a higher base offense level for White’s firearm offense if he had two qualifying prior convictions. The parties agreed that one conviction qualified. Whether he had the necessary second conviction depended on the Pennsylvania robbery offense.

The district court counted it. That increased White’s calculated Guidelines range from 100–125 months to 140–175 months. Because his firearm offense carried a statutory maximum of 120 months at the time he committed it, the higher calculation produced an advisory Guidelines sentence of 120 months.

The district court imposed 110 months after granting a downward variance based on White’s background. White appealed, arguing that the robbery conviction should never have supported the enhancement.

Why the State’s “Robbery” Label Did Not Control

The Guidelines version governing White’s sentencing provided two relevant ways for a prior conviction to qualify as a crime of violence.

The first, commonly called the elements clause, covered offenses requiring the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person. The second, called the enumerated-offenses clause, listed specific crimes, including robbery.

The Third Circuit had already held that Pennsylvania third-degree felony robbery did not satisfy the elements clause because it could involve only minimal touching. See United States v. Peppers, 899 F.3d 211, 230–34 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v. Henderson, 80 F.4th 207, 212 n.5 (3d Cir. 2023).

But that left a separate question: Could the conviction qualify simply because robbery appeared in the Guidelines’ list of enumerated offenses?

To answer that question, the court applied the categorical approach. It compared the elements of Pennsylvania’s offense with the elements of generic robbery—the generally accepted version of the crime.

This approach focuses on what a conviction necessarily establishes. It does not ask whether a particular person’s conduct might have been violent. If the state offense permits conviction for conduct falling outside the generic definition, the state offense is too broad to qualify.

Pennsylvania Robbery Covers Mere Snatching

White’s prior conviction arose under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3701(a)(1)(v). That subsection applies when someone, during a theft, physically takes or removes property from another person using “force however slight.”

The statutory language alone did not resolve the issue. The Third Circuit examined how Pennsylvania courts had interpreted it.

In Commonwealth v. Brown, 484 A.2d 738 (Pa. 1984), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a robbery conviction involving a purse snatched from a woman’s arm. It explained that the amount of force was immaterial so long as it was sufficient to separate the victim from property on or about her body.

The state court emphasized the victim’s awareness of the taking. Unlike an unnoticed pickpocketing, an apparent purse snatching could cause the victim to react and risk injury. Under that reasoning, the offense did not require proof that the victim actually resisted and that the person taking the property overcame that resistance.

Later decisions confirmed this interpretation. In Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008), the court upheld a third-degree robbery conviction where someone took a wallet from the victim’s hand and ran away.

These cases established that the statute’s breadth was real. Pennsylvania courts had applied it to takings involving no demonstrated struggle or resistance.

What Stokeling Says About Force

The central Supreme Court decision was Stokeling v. United States, 586 U.S. 73 (2019), which addressed Florida robbery under the Armed Career Criminal Act, or ACCA.

Stokeling held that force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance satisfies ACCA’s elements clause, even when the resistance is slight. A taking need not involve a severe beating or substantial injury to meet that standard.

But Stokeling also drew a boundary. Florida robbery requires overcoming resistance; merely snatching property does not suffice. The Court distinguished taking money from an unresisting hand from using force to pry open the victim’s fingers. The latter overcomes resistance. The former may involve nothing beyond the movement necessary to take the property. Id. at 86.

Although Stokeling addressed ACCA rather than the Guidelines’ enumerated robbery offense, the Third Circuit concluded that its discussion of common-law robbery helped establish generic robbery’s force requirement.

The court also considered the predominant approach among states and decisions from other federal appellate courts. Those sources supported the same distinction: generic robbery requires force sufficient to overcome resistance, while a sudden snatching without resistance falls outside that definition.

A 2023 Guidelines amendment reinforced that conclusion. The Sentencing Commission added an express robbery definition requiring force sufficient to overcome resistance. White was sentenced under the 2021 Guidelines, so the court did not simply apply the later amendment to him. It treated the amendment as additional support for its interpretation.

Why the Government’s Argument Failed

The government relied on a 2017 case which held that North Carolina common-law robbery qualified as generic robbery. That case described generic robbery as requiring only de minimis, or minimal, force.

According to the government, Pennsylvania robbery also required minimal force, so it should qualify under the same reasoning.

The Third Circuit rejected that comparison because it treated different legal requirements as interchangeable.

North Carolina’s minimal-force requirement still demands force sufficient to overcome resistance. For example, pushing a victim’s hands away from property involves overcoming the victim’s physical control. North Carolina decisions also distinguish that conduct from suddenly snatching a purse using only the force necessary to remove it.

Pennsylvania’s statute reaches further. Its third-degree robbery offense includes a taking from an aware victim even without resistance.

Calling both standards “minimal force” therefore obscured the decisive difference. A small amount of force can satisfy generic robbery when it overcomes resistance. A taking involving no resistance does not qualify merely because some physical movement occurred.

Why the Court Vacated the Sentence

The court’s reasoning followed directly from that comparison:

Pennsylvania third-degree felony robbery permits conviction for mere snatching. Generic robbery’s physical-force requirement demands overcoming resistance. Because the Pennsylvania offense includes conduct outside the generic definition, it is not a categorical match.

The court therefore held that White’s conviction could not qualify as enumerated robbery under § 4B1.2. Combined with the earlier decisions excluding the offense under the elements clause, that meant White lacked the two qualifying prior convictions necessary for the § 2K2.1(a)(1) enhancement.

The Third Circuit vacated his sentence and ordered resentencing without that enhancement. It did not set a replacement sentence or guarantee a particular reduction. The district court must conduct the new sentencing using the correct Guidelines framework.

What the Decision Means for Other Cases

White matters most directly to federal cases involving convictions under this specific Pennsylvania robbery subsection. It does not hold that every Pennsylvania robbery offense fails to qualify as a crime of violence. Other subsections have different elements and require separate analysis.

The decision also illustrates why reviewing a sentencing enhancement requires identifying the exact statute and subsection of conviction. A criminal-history entry saying only “robbery” may conceal a distinction that materially changes the Guidelines calculation.

For people whose sentences are already final, the substantive holding and the availability of a procedural remedy are separate questions. White arose on direct appeal; it did not decide whether someone with a final sentence could reopen that sentence through a postconviction motion.

The broader lesson is straightforward: federal sentencing consequences depend on the elements a prior conviction necessarily establishes. Pennsylvania may classify an unresisted purse snatching as robbery, but that classification alone cannot supply the resistance requirement missing from the offense.