The Eleventh Circuit has ruled that Alabama cannot permanently prohibit a father convicted of possessing child pornography from living with his own child without any individualized determination that he actually poses a danger to that child. Applying strict constitutional scrutiny, the court held that Alabama’s blanket lifetime restriction was too broad, too inconsistent, and unnecessarily restrictive because the state had less restrictive ways to protect children.
In Henry v. Sheriff of Tuscaloosa County, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 29834 (11th Cir. Sept. 29, 2026), the court held Alabama Code § 15-20A-11(d)(4) unconstitutional as applied to Henry. The statute permanently prevented Henry from residing or spending the night with his own son solely because Henry had previously been convicted of possessing child pornography. Alabama offered no hearing, no individualized risk assessment, and no procedure through which Henry could ever prove that he was a fit parent who posed no danger to his child.
This decision is especially important because it finishes the constitutional analysis that the en banc Eleventh Circuit began earlier this year. The full court had already held that people with sex-offense convictions do not automatically lose the fundamental constitutional right to live with their own children. The en banc court then sent the case back to the original panel to decide whether Alabama’s law could survive strict scrutiny. The September 29 decision answers that question: as applied to Henry, it could not.
Alabama Permanently Barred Henry From Living With His Son
Henry pleaded guilty in 2013 to possessing child pornography. Before that case, he had no history of sexual offenses. He eventually served five years in prison and was released in March 2018. After his release, he completed a qualified sex-offender treatment program, participated in individual and group counseling, continued attending Sex Addicts Anonymous meetings, maintained employment, attended church, and volunteered.
Henry and his wife had a son in August 2021. That is when Alabama law created the constitutional problem.
Under Alabama’s Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act, a person convicted of a sex offense involving a child cannot “reside or conduct an overnight visit with a minor,” even when that minor is the person’s own child. The statute specifically includes child-pornography offenses within that prohibition.
The restrictions meant Henry could not be in the same home with his son at any time between 10:30 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. He also could not spend more than four hours per day there for three consecutive days, more than four hours per day on ten days in a month, or otherwise be habitually present in the home.
More importantly, the restriction was permanent.
Alabama provided no procedure allowing Henry to prove later that he was rehabilitated, had successfully completed treatment, presented a low risk, or was capable of safely parenting his child. Someone could live a law-abiding life for decades and still remain permanently prohibited from living with his or her own minor child.
Why There Were Multiple Eleventh Circuit Decisions in This Case
The unusual procedural history is important because this was not the first time the Eleventh Circuit ruled in Henry’s case.
Henry initially sued Alabama officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and challenged the restriction on his ability to live with his son. The district court went broadly in his favor, declaring the parent-child residence prohibition facially unconstitutional and universally enjoining its enforcement.
A three-judge Eleventh Circuit panel later agreed that the law burdened Henry’s fundamental right to live with and raise his child and concluded that the restriction failed strict scrutiny. But the panel disagreed with the district court’s broader facial ruling and universal injunction.
Then the full Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc. That action vacated the earlier panel decision.
The en banc court focused on the threshold constitutional question: does a parent like Henry retain a fundamental right to live with his own child despite having a sex-offense conviction? The full court answered yes.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected Alabama’s position that Henry’s conviction automatically eliminated that fundamental right. Because the right remained fundamental, any law burdening it had to survive strict scrutiny. The en banc court then returned the case to the panel to determine whether Alabama could meet that demanding constitutional test. That is the issue the September 29 panel decision resolved.
Strict Scrutiny Changed Everything
Strict scrutiny places the burden on the government. Alabama therefore had to do more than show that protecting children is an important governmental objective. The court readily acknowledged that protecting the physical and psychological wellbeing of children is a compelling state interest.
But identifying a compelling interest is only half the analysis.
Alabama also had to prove that permanently preventing Henry from living with his child was narrowly tailored to advance that interest. When fundamental constitutional rights are involved, the government cannot use unnecessarily broad restrictions when more focused alternatives can accomplish the same objective.
The Eleventh Circuit found three major problems with Alabama’s law.
1. The Law Was Overinclusive
The court first concluded that Alabama’s law swept far too broadly.
The statute assumed that every person with a qualifying conviction involving a child necessarily posed enough danger to his or her own child to justify a lifetime residential ban. But the court found that the conviction alone did not establish that conclusion.
The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that the statute included offenses bearing little relationship to whether someone would abuse his own child. The court gave the example of a 19-year-old convicted after downloading sexually explicit material sent by his 16-year-old high-school girlfriend. Under Alabama’s statute, that person could marry the same woman, have children with her decades later, live an otherwise law-abiding life, and still be permanently forbidden from residing with those children.
Henry’s own circumstances exposed the same problem.
Alabama relied heavily on studies and statistics concerning recidivism among people convicted of child-pornography offenses. But those statistics frequently combined people with prior contact offenses with people whose criminal histories involved only possession or viewing.
The statute itself made no such distinction.
That mattered because Alabama was attempting to use Henry’s child-pornography conviction as evidence that he might previously have committed an undiscovered contact offense, and then use that assumed contact offense as evidence that he might pose a danger to his own child.
The court rejected that chain of assumptions. It found no direct evidence in the record showing that people like Henry—whose known offense was non-contact possession and who had no prior contact offense—necessarily presented a danger to their own children.
The court also took apart Alabama’s recidivism argument.
Alabama presented an estimated recidivism range of 9.2% to 46% for child-pornography offenders. The Eleventh Circuit noted that a range spanning roughly 37 percentage points was so uncertain that it significantly weakened Alabama’s argument.
More importantly, even if the court accepted Alabama’s highest figure of 46%, more than half of the parents subjected to the restriction would not recidivate under Alabama’s own estimate.
When the government is permanently interfering with a fundamental parent-child relationship, that was not good enough.
2. The Law Was Also Underinclusive
Oddly enough, Alabama’s law was simultaneously too broad and not broad enough.
The state argued that it needed to prevent people with qualifying convictions from living with their children because of the potential danger to minors. Yet the statute could still permit those same people significant unsupervised daytime access to their children.
The Eleventh Circuit explained that Alabama law could allow a qualifying offender unsupervised access to a child for four hours at a time on two consecutive days and on as many as nine days during a month, so long as the conduct did not cross the statutory line into residency or an overnight visit.
That created a serious inconsistency.
Someone Alabama considered too dangerous to sleep under the same roof as his child could nevertheless have repeated unsupervised daytime access to that child. The court reasoned that this undermined Alabama’s claim that a permanent categorical residential prohibition was narrowly tailored to protecting children.
The court did not accuse Alabama of acting in bad faith. In fact, it expressly recognized Alabama’s legitimate interest in protecting children. The constitutional problem was that the structure of the statute did not closely match the risk Alabama claimed it was addressing.
3. Alabama Had Less Restrictive Ways to Protect Children
The third problem may be the most important part of the decision.
Alabama did not need to choose between a blanket lifetime ban and doing nothing.
Henry identified several alternatives the state could use to protect children while still respecting parental rights. Alabama could provide individualized hearings where a parent is required to demonstrate fitness. It could permit residence when another qualified caregiver is present. It could limit the offenses that trigger the restriction. It could impose a time limitation. It could create criteria for regaining the ability to live with a child following treatment or rehabilitation.
The Eleventh Circuit also identified another possibility: Alabama could create a rebuttable presumption against residency rather than imposing an absolute prohibition that can never be challenged.
The court did not hold that Alabama must adopt any particular alternative. It did not design a replacement statute for the legislature.
It simply held that viable and less restrictive alternatives existed, which meant Alabama had not demonstrated that its absolute lifetime ban was necessary.
That point is critical.
Under the existing Alabama law, even if a judge, treatment provider, expert, family member, and every other person involved concluded that an individual posed no threat whatsoever to his child, none of it mattered. The statute provided no mechanism for the court to consider that evidence.
The Eleventh Circuit found that fundamentally incompatible with the constitutional protection afforded to the parent-child relationship.
Alabama Was an Extreme Outlier
The court also emphasized how unusual Alabama’s law was.
According to the record before the court, every other state in the country apparently provides some opportunity for an affected person to establish either that he does not pose a danger to his child or that allowing the parent and child to live together would be in the child’s best interest.
Neither Alabama nor the parties could identify another state with a substantially similar absolute lifetime prohibition.
That did not automatically make Alabama’s law unconstitutional. But it supported Henry’s argument that less restrictive systems were not hypothetical. Other jurisdictions were already using them.
If virtually every other state could protect children without imposing Alabama’s absolute rule, Alabama had a much harder time proving that its approach was the least restrictive way to accomplish the same objective.
The Court Did Not Strike Down the Entire Statute
There is an important limitation to this decision.
The Eleventh Circuit did not declare Alabama Code § 15-20A-11(d)(4) unconstitutional in every possible application.
The court repeatedly described the ruling as an as-applied decision involving Henry, and the formal disposition says exactly that: “AFFIRMED AS APPLIED TO HENRY.”
That distinction matters.
Henry was a non-contact offender. His conviction involved possession of child pornography rather than a hands-on offense against a child. The Eleventh Circuit expressly noted that it did not have evidence before it establishing whether people convicted of contact offenses present the same or different levels of future dangerousness.
The court therefore left open the possibility that Alabama might be able to justify different restrictions against different categories of offenders on a proper evidentiary record.
But what Alabama cannot do to someone situated like Henry is simply point to the conviction and permanently end the inquiry.
Why This Decision Matters Beyond Alabama
This case is important because it attacks one of the most common assumptions underlying sex-offender restrictions: that the conviction itself can permanently substitute for an individualized determination of present danger.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected that premise where a fundamental constitutional right was involved.
A past conviction remains highly relevant. The government can consider it. Courts can consider the nature of the offense, criminal history, treatment history, conduct on supervision, expert evaluations, and any other evidence relevant to the safety of a child.
What the government cannot necessarily do is turn that conviction into an irrebuttable lifetime presumption that the person will always be an unfit or dangerous parent.
That difference between a presumption and an individualized determination is huge.
The opinion also provides a useful framework for challenging other restrictions affecting fundamental rights. Courts examining those laws may ask the same questions the Eleventh Circuit asked here: Does the restriction actually correspond to the risk the government says it is addressing? Does it sweep in people who do not present that risk? Does it leave similar or greater risks unregulated? Could the government accomplish the same objective through individualized review or another less restrictive system?
Those questions will matter far beyond Henry’s particular circumstances.
What This Means for Parents With Sex-Offense Convictions
This decision does not mean that every person with a sex-offense conviction has an unrestricted constitutional right to live with a minor child.
It means something narrower but extremely important: the government cannot automatically assume that a qualifying conviction permanently makes someone incapable of safely living with his or her own child when a fundamental parental right is at stake.
For people affected by similar residency restrictions, the details will matter. The nature of the original offense, whether there was a contact offense, the relationship to the original victim, treatment history, conduct following release, risk evaluations, time in the community, parenting history, and the specific language of the applicable state statute can all affect the constitutional analysis.
And because Henry was an as-applied challenge, someone bringing a similar case will need to develop a factual record explaining why the law is unconstitutional in that person’s particular circumstances.
That makes individualized evidence extremely important.
The Bottom Line
The Eleventh Circuit has now completed what the en banc court started.
First, the full Eleventh Circuit held that Henry did not lose his fundamental constitutional right to live with his own child merely because he had a sex-offense conviction.
Then the panel asked the next question: could Alabama nevertheless permanently prohibit him from living with his son?
The answer was no.
Alabama unquestionably has a compelling interest in protecting children. But constitutional rights cannot be eliminated through a permanent one-size-fits-all rule merely because that rule is easier to administer.
When the government burdens a fundamental right, it must show that its restriction is actually tailored to the danger it seeks to prevent. In Henry’s case, Alabama could not do that.
The statute treated people with very different offenses and risk levels the same, permanently barred parents who may pose no danger at all, still permitted potentially dangerous people significant unsupervised access to children, and refused to provide any procedure through which a parent could ever prove rehabilitation or fitness.
That was not narrow tailoring. And under strict scrutiny, that was enough to make Alabama’s lifetime prohibition unconstitutional as applied to Henry.

Dale Chappell prepares people in sensitive, high-profile, and high-stakes federal cases for prison. He works with clients, families, and attorneys during pretrial, throughout incarceration, and during the transition to halfway house placement, home confinement, and supervised release.
Dale brings more than 17 years of experience, firsthand knowledge of the federal prison system, and experience testifying at high-profile public hearings on prison and criminal justice issues. He helps clients protect their safety and privacy, avoid decisions that can follow them throughout their sentences, and prepare for the strongest possible outcome at every stage.
Dale has written nearly 600 published articles on federal prison, post-conviction, and criminal justice issues.
Have questions?
Contact Dale directly at dale@facingfederalprison.com.


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