Why Mandatory Minimums Do Not Always Block Later Sentence Reductions

A federal appeals court has held that a defendant who previously received a substantial-assistance reduction below a statutory mandatory minimum may later qualify for another sentence reduction when the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowers the Guidelines range that originally drove the sentence.

In United States v. Hilton, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 26897 (6th Cir. Sept. 1, 2026), the Sixth Circuit vacated the denial of Brandy Hilton’s motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The court held that Hilton’s sentence was still “based on” a Guidelines range even though she was originally subject to two mandatory minimum sentences, and that her prior substantial-assistance reduction required the court to disregard those mandatory minimums when calculating her new amended Guidelines range.

The decision is important because it shows that a statutory mandatory minimum does not always end the analysis when a defendant later seeks relief under a retroactive Guidelines amendment. Once the government has moved for a substantial-assistance reduction and the court has imposed a sentence below the mandatory minimum, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) can change how the sentencing court calculates the defendant’s amended range years later.

Why Hilton Was Subject to Two Mandatory Minimum Sentences

Hilton pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The drug count carried a 60-month mandatory minimum. The firearm count carried another 60-month mandatory minimum that had to run consecutively.

At Hilton’s original sentencing, her offense level was 21 and her criminal-history category was IV, producing an ordinary Guidelines range of 57 to 71 months. Because the drug count carried a 60-month mandatory minimum, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1 raised the bottom of that range from 57 months to 60 months. The court then had to add the consecutive 60-month § 924(c) sentence under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2. Her final Guidelines range therefore became 120 to 131 months, and the district court sentenced her to 120 months, the bottom of that range.

Why the 120-to-131-Month Range Mattered

The government later argued that Hilton’s sentence was based on the statutory mandatory minimums rather than on the Guidelines. That distinction mattered because § 3582(c)(2) permits a reduction only when a defendant was sentenced “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”

The Sixth Circuit rejected the government’s characterization because Hilton’s mandatory minimums did not completely replace the Guidelines range. They raised the bottom of the range, but the court still had a range of 120 to 131 months to work with. The judge could have imposed 120, 125, 130, or 131 months and remained within the Guidelines.

That was different from a situation where a statutory minimum completely displaces the Guidelines range and becomes the only sentence that matters.

The Government Later Asked the Court to Reduce Hilton’s Sentence

About a year after sentencing, the government filed a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) based on Hilton’s substantial assistance in another investigation and prosecution. Rule 35(b) allows the government to ask for a sentence reduction after sentencing when a defendant provides substantial assistance, while 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) authorizes a court to go below a statutory mandatory minimum for that reason.

The government did not simply ask the judge to take an arbitrary number of months off Hilton’s sentence. It specifically requested what it described as a one-level reduction, producing an effective Guidelines range of 100 to 125 months. The district court used the same framework, stating that it was applying a one-level reduction and that the resulting effective range was 100 to 125 months. The court then reduced Hilton’s sentence from 120 months to 100 months.

That meant Hilton was now serving a sentence below the combined 120 months required by the two statutory minimums.

Why the Rule 35(b) Motion Became So Important

Years later, the way the government and sentencing judge described Hilton’s Rule 35(b) reduction became critical. Both sides continued to measure Hilton’s sentence in Guidelines terms. The government asked for a one-level Guidelines reduction, and the district court expressly adopted that approach.

The Sixth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hughes v. United States, which explains that a sentence is generally “based on” a Guidelines range when that range serves as the starting point or framework used by the sentencing judge. A sentence does not stop being Guidelines-based merely because the court later departs or varies from the original range.

For Hilton, the record showed that the Guidelines remained part of the analytical framework used to determine her sentence. That was enough to satisfy the first requirement of § 3582(c)(2).

Amendment 821 Later Lowered Hilton’s Criminal-History Category

After Hilton received the Rule 35(b) reduction, the Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 821 and later made it retroactive. Under the old version of the Guidelines, Hilton received two additional criminal-history points because she committed the federal offenses while under another criminal justice sentence. Those points placed her in criminal-history category IV.

Under Amendment 821, Hilton’s criminal-history category would instead be III. With an offense level of 21 and criminal-history category III, her ordinary range on the drug count would have been 46 to 57 months.

The problem was that the drug count still carried a 60-month mandatory minimum, and the § 924(c) conviction still carried another consecutive 60 months. If those mandatory minimums continued to control the calculation, Hilton’s amended range would still be 120 months, which would make it appear that Amendment 821 had not actually lowered the range that mattered.

Hilton argued that the prior substantial-assistance reduction changed the calculation. The Sixth Circuit agreed.

The District Court Said the Mandatory Minimum Still Controlled

Hilton filed a motion under § 3582(c)(2), arguing that Amendment 821 lowered her Guidelines range and that her prior substantial-assistance reduction meant the mandatory minimums should not control the amended calculation. She contended that her new range was 106 to 117 months and asked the court to account for the substantial-assistance reduction she had already received, resulting in a requested sentence of 86 months.

The district court denied relief. It concluded that Hilton’s original sentence was based on the statutory minimums rather than on a Guidelines range, which meant she could not get through the threshold requirement of § 3582(c)(2).

The Sixth Circuit found that conclusion wrong.

The Sixth Circuit Found Hilton’s Sentence Was Still Based on the Guidelines

The Sixth Circuit emphasized that Hilton’s original range had been 120 to 131 months and that the district court imposed a sentence within that range. When the government later sought the Rule 35(b) reduction, both the government and the judge continued to describe the sentence in Guidelines terms.

The court found it significant that the government requested a one-level reduction and that the district court expressly adopted an effective Guidelines range of 100 to 125 months. That record showed that the Guidelines remained the starting point for Hilton’s sentence.

The government’s position would have meant that Hilton was ineligible for relief simply because the district court happened to choose the very bottom of the 120-to-131-month range. The Sixth Circuit found that approach inconsistent with both the logic of the sentencing process and the text of § 3582(c)(2).

Why Koons Did Not Block Relief

The government relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Koons v. United States. In Koons, the defendants had ordinary Guidelines ranges that were entirely below their statutory mandatory minimums. In one example discussed by the Sixth Circuit, a defendant had a Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months but faced a statutory mandatory minimum of 240 months.

In that situation, the mandatory minimum completely displaced the Guidelines range. The sentencing court no longer had a meaningful Guidelines range to work with, so the Supreme Court held that the defendants’ later sentences were not “based on” the original Guidelines range for purposes of § 3582(c)(2).

Hilton’s case was different. Her mandatory minimum did not replace the Guidelines range; it merely raised the lower end of it. She still had an operative Guidelines range of 120 to 131 months, which the district court actually used. That was enough to distinguish Koons.

Why § 1B1.10(c) Required the Court to Disregard the Mandatory Minimums

After deciding that Hilton’s sentence was based on a Guidelines range, the Sixth Circuit turned to the second question: whether Amendment 821 actually lowered that range.

This is where U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) became critical. Section 1B1.10 governs sentence reductions based on retroactive Guidelines amendments. It tells courts how to calculate the amended range when determining eligibility for relief under § 3582(c)(2).

Section 1B1.10(c) contains a special rule for defendants who were subject to a statutory mandatory minimum but previously received a substantial-assistance reduction below that minimum. In that situation, the court calculates the amended Guidelines range without regard to the mandatory minimum.

The Sixth Circuit explained that when a defendant like Hilton previously received a Rule 35(b) substantial-assistance reduction, the mandatory minimums fall out of the picture when the amended range is recalculated.

That changed the result. Instead of treating Hilton’s amended range as a flat 120 months, the court had to calculate it without the mandatory minimums. That produced a new range of 106 to 117 months. Because her original range had been 120 to 131 months, Amendment 821 had plainly lowered the range on which her sentence was based.

The Guidelines Included an Example Almost Identical to Hilton’s Case

The Sixth Circuit also pointed to Application Note 4(B) to § 1B1.10. The example involved a defendant whose ordinary Guidelines range would have been 108 to 135 months but who faced a 120-month statutory mandatory minimum. After a substantial-assistance motion, the court imposed a sentence of 90 months.

Later, a retroactive Guidelines amendment lowered the ordinary range to 87 to 108 months. Because the defendant had previously received a substantial-assistance reduction, § 1B1.10(c) instructed the court to use the 87-to-108-month range rather than the 120-month mandatory minimum.

The Sixth Circuit found that example closely tracked Hilton’s situation. It also rejected any concern that the commentary was improperly expanding the Guideline, explaining that the text of § 1B1.10(c) itself already required the same result.

The Government Argued That § 1B1.10(c) Conflicted With Mandatory Minimum Law

The government also argued that allowing § 1B1.10(c) to disregard the statutory minimums would improperly permit the Sentencing Commission to override Congress.

The Sixth Circuit rejected that argument because Congress had already created the substantial-assistance exception. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), Congress expressly authorized courts to impose a sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum when the government moves for a reduction based on substantial assistance.

Hilton had already received that benefit. Section 1B1.10(c) was not independently erasing the mandatory minimum. It was simply telling the sentencing court how to calculate the amended Guidelines range after Congress had already authorized a below-minimum sentence.

That distinction allowed the Sixth Circuit to apply § 1B1.10(c) without finding any conflict with the statutory mandatory minimums.

Substantial Assistance Can Matter Again Years Later

One of the most important lessons from Hilton is that a substantial-assistance motion can continue to matter long after the original reduction is granted. The immediate benefit is obvious because the defendant can receive a sentence below what would otherwise be required by statute.

But Hilton shows that the same substantial-assistance motion may also affect how a later retroactive Guidelines amendment is applied. Once a defendant has received a substantial-assistance sentence below the mandatory minimum, § 1B1.10(c) may allow the sentencing court to calculate a later amended range without allowing that mandatory minimum to continue functioning as the floor.

That does not mean every person who received a substantial-assistance reduction automatically qualifies for another sentence reduction. The amendment still has to apply, the original sentence still has to be based on a Guidelines range, and the new range still has to be lower.

But it means the existence of an old mandatory minimum should not automatically end the inquiry.

How the Original Rule 35 Record Can Become Important Later

Another practical lesson from Hilton is that the language used during the original substantial-assistance proceeding can matter years later.

The government did not simply ask the court to reduce Hilton’s sentence by 20 months. It framed the request as a one-level Guidelines reduction, and the district court did the same. Those statements helped Hilton establish that the Guidelines remained the framework used to determine her sentence.

That suggests defense counsel should pay close attention to the record created during § 3553(e), § 5K1.1, and Rule 35 proceedings. A record showing that the court started from a particular Guidelines range, measured the substantial-assistance reduction from that range, and imposed a sentence based on that calculation may become important if the Sentencing Commission later makes another amendment retroactive.

The way a sentence is explained today can affect whether relief is available years later.

What Defendants and Families Can Learn from Hilton

Hilton does not mean that everyone serving a sentence involving a mandatory minimum can obtain relief under § 3582(c)(2). The details matter.

Several questions should be examined:

• What was the original Guidelines range?
• Did the mandatory minimum completely replace the Guidelines range, or did it only raise the bottom of the range?
• Did the government file a substantial-assistance motion under § 3553(e), § 5K1.1, or Rule 35(b)?
• Did the resulting sentence fall below the statutory mandatory minimum?
• How did the government describe the requested reduction?
• How did the sentencing judge describe the reduction?
• Did the judge expressly calculate an effective Guidelines range?
• Has the Sentencing Commission later made an amendment retroactive?
• Does that amendment lower the defendant’s otherwise applicable Guidelines range?
• Does U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) require the court to disregard the mandatory minimum when calculating the amended range?

The sentencing transcript, Rule 35 motion, government memorandum, court order, presentence report, statement of reasons, and amended judgment may all matter. The issue is not simply whether the defendant once had a mandatory minimum. The real question is what sentencing range the court actually used and what happened after the government obtained authority to go below the statutory floor.

Hilton Did Not Automatically Receive a Lower Sentence

The Sixth Circuit did not order the district court to reduce Hilton’s sentence to 86 months. It decided only that the district court was wrong to conclude that Hilton was categorically ineligible for relief under § 3582(c)(2).

Hilton cleared the threshold requirement because her sentence was based on a Guidelines range and Amendment 821 subsequently lowered that range. The case was sent back to the district court to decide whether a reduction is appropriate under the applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements and the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

That means Hilton won the right to have the court properly consider her request. She did not yet win a particular sentence.

A Mandatory Minimum Does Not Always End the Guidelines Analysis

The central lesson from Hilton is that courts must distinguish between a mandatory minimum that completely replaces a Guidelines range and one that merely affects part of that range.

Hilton’s mandatory minimums did not erase the Guidelines. Her original range was 120 to 131 months, and the sentencing court imposed a sentence within that range. Later, the government expressly asked for a substantial-assistance reduction measured in Guidelines terms, and the court granted it using the same framework.

Once Amendment 821 lowered Hilton’s criminal-history category, § 1B1.10(c) required the court to calculate the amended Guidelines range without allowing those mandatory minimums to control. That produced a new range of 106 to 117 months.

The district court therefore could not deny Hilton relief simply by saying her sentence was based on the statutory minimums. For defendants who previously received substantial-assistance reductions and are now looking at a retroactive Guidelines amendment, Hilton is an important reminder: a prior mandatory minimum may not be the end of the sentence-reduction analysis.