News for July 3, 2026: Murder Convictions Vacated, Gun Ban Limits, Sentencing Errors, and BOP Closures

This week’s newsletter covers several favorable federal court decisions and developments affecting sentencing, convictions, and post-conviction relief. As always, the goal is to keep readers informed about important legal rulings that may impact ongoing cases, appeals, and future challenges in federal court.

United States v. Lynn, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 19026 (10th Cir. June 30, 2026)

Government Must Disprove Imperfect Self-Defense Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

The Tenth Circuit vacated Lynn’s first-degree murder conviction because the jury instructions mishandled imperfect self-defense. The district court instructed the jury on imperfect self-defense, which can reduce murder to involuntary manslaughter when the defendant actually believed deadly force was necessary, even if that belief was unreasonable. But the instructions did not tell jurors that, once the defense was raised, the government had to disprove imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. That mattered because imperfect self-defense negates malice, which is required for murder. The instruction structure also created a problem because the jury was told to consider lesser offenses only after deciding the murder charges, making it unclear whether jurors were allowed to consider imperfect self-defense when deciding murder itself. The Tenth Circuit held that this was not harmless. Once the court gave the imperfect self-defense instruction, the government had to carry the burden of disproving it. Because the jury was not properly instructed on that burden, the murder conviction was vacated and the case was remanded. The court rejected Lynn’s other challenges, including his arguments about Indian status and the perfect self-defense instruction.

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United States v. Tairan Shi, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 19452 (9th Cir. July 2, 2026)

Sophisticated-Laundering Enhancement Cannot Stack on the Business-of-Laundering Enhancement

The Ninth Circuit vacated part of the defendants’ sentences because the district court improperly stacked two money-laundering enhancements. The court upheld the loss calculation, including intended loss, and rejected the argument that the defendants were entitled to a three-level reduction for an incomplete conspiracy. But the court found error in the sophisticated-laundering enhancement under U.S.S.G. sec. 2S1.1(b)(3). That enhancement applies only if sec. 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) applies, meaning the defendant receives the two-level increase for a sec. 1956 conviction. Here, the district court did not apply that two-level increase because it applied the greater four-level increase under sec. 2S1.1(b)(2)(C) for being in the business of laundering funds. The government argued that it was enough that the defendants were convicted under sec. 1956, but the Ninth Circuit rejected that reading. The guideline requires that sec. 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) actually apply, not merely that it could have applied. Because the court used the four-level business-of-laundering enhancement, it could not also add the two-level sophisticated-laundering enhancement. The case was remanded for a limited resentencing.

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United States v. Rose, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 19493 (7th Cir. July 2, 2026)

Past Mental Commitment Alone May Not Justify Lifetime Gun Ban

The Seventh Circuit held that sec. 922(g)(4), which bars gun possession by someone previously committed to a mental institution, raises serious Second Amendment problems when applied to someone who is no longer mentally ill or dangerous. The court explained that after Rahimi and Hemani, the relevant question is current dangerousness, not simply whether a person fell within a prohibited category years earlier. Historical tradition supports disarming people who are currently dangerous, currently mentally ill, or recently adjudicated dangerous. But the government did not identify historical support for permanently disarming people whose mental-health problems were temporary or who later recovered. Still, Rose did not automatically win. The district court dismissed the indictment without holding an evidentiary hearing, even though the record did not show why Rose was committed, whether his condition was temporary or ongoing, whether he recovered, or whether he remained dangerous. The Seventh Circuit held that an as-applied challenge requires a case-specific record. The dismissal was vacated, and the case was remanded for the district court to take evidence and determine whether Rose currently presents a credible threat to public safety.

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United States v. Covington, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 19473 (4th Cir. July 2, 2026)

Section 242 “Results From” Enhancement Requires Proximate Cause

The Fourth Circuit vacated a sec. 242 civil-rights conviction because the jury was not instructed on proximate cause. Section 242 increases punishment when bodily injury or death “results from” the constitutional violation. The government argued that it only had to prove but-for causation. The Fourth Circuit rejected that argument and held that “results from” in sec. 242 requires both but-for cause and proximate cause. That means the government must prove the injury was not only caused by the defendant’s conduct, but was also a natural and foreseeable result of that conduct. The error was not harmless because the jury could have relied on later injuries caused after other people became involved, and a properly instructed jury might have found those later injuries were not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. The court held the evidence was sufficient, so the remedy was not acquittal. But because the jury never received the required proximate-cause instruction, the conviction was vacated and the case was remanded. The court also vacated one defendant’s sentence because the district court did not properly analyze whether acquitted conduct or other disputed conduct could be used as relevant conduct under the Guidelines.

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United States v. Rosario, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 19242 (3d Cir. July 1, 2026)

Categorical Approach Applies to 841(b)(1)(C) Prior Drug Convictions

The Third Circuit affirmed Rosario’s convictions but vacated his mandatory life sentence. The important ruling is the sentencing issue. Section 841(b)(1)(C) requires a mandatory life sentence when a drug offense results in death or serious bodily injury and the defendant has a prior “felony drug offense.” The district court used a looser, conduct-based approach to decide whether Rosario’s prior Pennsylvania drug convictions qualified. That was error. The Third Circuit held that the traditional categorical approach applies because the statute turns on the prior conviction, not what the defendant actually did in the prior case. The court must compare the elements of the state offense to the federal definition of “felony drug offense.” It cannot rely on the real-world facts behind the prior conviction. The court rejected Rosario’s broader argument that sec. 841(b)(1)(C) is unconstitutional or that courts can rewrite the statute because the First Step Act created harsh sentencing differences between subsections. But because the wrong approach was used to determine whether his priors qualified, the mandatory life sentence was vacated and the case was remanded for resentencing. The court otherwise affirmed, including rejecting the Facebook warrant challenge under the good-faith exception and holding that accepting guns as payment for drugs can support a sec. 924(c) conviction.

BOP’s Increasing Sex Offense Population

Federal prisons are aging into a crisis the BOP is not prepared to handle. Drug and firearm cases have long made up the largest portions of the federal population, often involving younger defendants who still had a realistic chance of leaving prison with time to rebuild.

SO cases are different. Current BOP statistics show that sex offenses are now the third-largest offense group in federal prison. That is still behind drug offenses and weapons/explosives/arson cases, but it is rapidly closing in on the weapons category. That matters because many people with SO cases enter custody older than the typical drug or gun defendant. Add decades-long sentences, and the result is a population aging inside the BOP instead of cycling out.

This creates more than a bed-space problem. Older prisoners require chronic care, cancer treatment, heart care, mobility support, mental-health services, outside medical trips, and more staff time. The BOP already struggles to provide basic medical care. Keeping more people in custody into old age will only make that worse. This is what happens when sentencing policy is driven by fear instead of evidence. Extreme sentences create long-term costs the prison system cannot absorb forever. At some point, Congress, the courts, and the BOP will have to confront that reality.

BOP Prison Closures

A press release on the BOP’s website says this: WASHINGTON, D.C.: Today, U.S. Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP or Bureau) announced several facility closures and operational changes to address decades of deferred maintenance and extreme staffing challenges.  Accordingly, the BOP will close the following institutions:  Beaumont FCI Low;   Big Spring FCI and Satellite Camp;  La Tuna FCI, FSL (Federal Satellite Low), and Satellite Camp;  Lexington FMC Satellite Camp;  Petersburg FCI Low;   Taft FCI …….. In addition, Morgantown FPC and Duluth FPC will transition from minimum-security camps to FSL facilities.  

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Download the free guide, Insider’s Guide to Using Habeas Corpus to Get Out of Prison, for a practical overview of how habeas corpus works and why many post-conviction filings fail.

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