This week covers several issues: a court of appeals shut down the BOP’s attempt to rewrite the First Step Act by delaying when prisoners can earn time credits, another court made clear that checkbox denials of compassionate release are not enough and require real judicial analysis, and a court granted compassionate release where the BOP could not provide adequate medical care, showing that failing to meet an inmate’s medical needs can justify early release.
United States v. McPherson, No. 25-12539, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 12851 (11th Cir. May 4, 2026)
Court Cannot Deny Compassionate Release with a Checkbox and No Explanation
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the denial of a compassionate release motion where the district court did essentially nothing to justify its decision, relying instead on a pre-printed form and simply checking a box stating the motion was denied “after complete review” without providing any explanation or analysis. McPherson had presented evidence of serious and worsening health conditions, including significant cardiac issues and deterioration due to age, and the government opposed on multiple grounds, but the district court failed to address any of those arguments, did not indicate whether it was denying based on exhaustion, lack of extraordinary and compelling reasons, or the § 3553(a) factors, and gave no indication it actually considered the updated medical evidence or the passage of time since the prior denial. The court of appeals made clear that this kind of boilerplate, checkbox-style ruling is not enough because appellate courts cannot conduct meaningful review unless they can see how the district court reached its decision and what factors it relied on, emphasizing that while form orders can be used, they must still reflect that the court did the work, which did not happen here.
United States v. Browning, No. 22-20679, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95438 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 30, 2026)
BOP’s Inability to Provide Medical Care Drives Compassionate Release
The district court granted compassionate release primarily because the Bureau of Prisons could not provide the level of medical care Browning required, making continued incarceration no longer appropriate under the law. Browning suffered multiple strokes that left him cortically blind, cognitively impaired, and unable to care for himself, requiring assistance with basic daily functions and spending most of his time confined to a bed or wheelchair, but what mattered most to the court was that his condition continued to decline in BOP custody and that the facility was not capable of adequately treating his complex medical needs. The court specifically found that even though Browning had previously received specialized care at an outside medical facility, his condition worsened after returning to BOP custody, showing that the system could not maintain or improve his health, and that lack of adequate care created a serious risk of further deterioration. Based on that failure, the court concluded that extraordinary and compelling reasons existed and that the § 3553(a) factors no longer justified keeping him incarcerated, ultimately reducing his sentence to time served so he could obtain proper medical treatment outside of prison.
Miles v. Bowers, No. 25-1291, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11998 (1st Cir. Apr. 27, 2026)
BOP Policy on FSA Credits Found to Violate Federal Law
The First Circuit granted relief because the Bureau of Prisons was applying policies that directly contradicted the plain language of the First Step Act, making clear that the agency cannot rewrite the statute to limit when prisoners begin earning time credits. The BOP argued that prisoners cannot earn FSA credits until they arrive at their designated federal facility and complete a risk and needs assessment, but the court rejected that position outright, explaining that the statute defines when a sentence begins as the moment a person is taken into custody awaiting transport, not when they arrive at a BOP prison, and that the law requires prisoners to be able to earn credits throughout their entire term of incarceration. By creating regulations that delay the start of credit earning until arrival at a federal facility, the BOP imposed a restriction that does not exist in the statute, and the court held that this conflict makes the policy invalid. The court also rejected the BOP’s attempt to treat the risk assessment as a gatekeeping requirement, explaining that while an assessment may be required before credits are applied, it is not required before credits are earned, and the BOP cannot deny credits simply because programming occurred before that assessment or at a non-BOP facility. The key takeaway here is bigger than just this case: this is a blueprint for challenging BOP policies that add requirements not found in the law. The First Step Act says prisoners “shall earn” credits once their sentence begins, and agencies do not get to override that with internal memos, program statements, or convenience-based rules. This is a clear winning argument when the BOP creates policies that conflict with the statute itself, courts are now willing to step in and enforce the actual text of the law rather than defer to the agency.

Dale Chappell works with individuals, families, and attorneys on sensitive and high-profile federal cases, focusing on prison preparation, housing, and post-conviction strategy. He supports clients and legal teams with research, issue analysis, and drafting used in federal post-conviction matters, including § 2255 motions, appeals, sentence reductions, and related filings.
His work is based on nearly 17 years of experience and more than 450 published articles in legal publications focused on post-conviction relief. His focus is helping clients and their families understand how the system actually works and avoiding preventable mistakes.
Have questions?
Email Dale directly at dale@dale-chappell.com.


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