The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the denial of a federal prisoner’s § 2255 motion after finding that his attorney’s seriously inaccurate sentencing advice caused him to reject a favorable plea agreement. Instead of accepting a deal carrying an estimated 15 to 17 years in prison, Steven Baker went to trial and received more than 64 years. The appellate court concluded that his attorney’s failure to explain the mandatory minimum sentence he actually faced amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.
In Baker v. United States, 109 F.4th 187 (3d Cir. 2024), the court held that the enormous disparity between the rejected plea offer and the sentence imposed was compelling evidence that Baker would have accepted the deal had he received accurate advice. The court reversed the denial of relief and ordered the government to reoffer the original plea agreement.
This case illustrates something I’ve emphasized throughout my years working on federal postconviction cases: A defendant cannot make an informed decision about a plea agreement when his attorney doesn’t understand the sentencing consequences of rejecting it. More importantly, proving that bad advice caused the defendant to reject a plea requires more than simply claiming that the lawyer got it wrong.
How Bad Sentencing Advice Led to a 64-Year Sentence
Baker was originally charged with bank robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Federal prosecutors offered him a plea agreement requiring him to plead guilty to two charges and admit involvement in two additional armed bank robberies. In exchange, the government agreed not to pursue additional charges related to those robberies.
The proposed agreement carried an estimated sentence of 15 to 17 years.
Baker’s attorney advised him that rejecting the agreement would expose him to additional charges, including two more § 924(c) firearm offenses. But she made a critical mistake when calculating the mandatory sentences for those charges.
She told Baker that the three firearm convictions would result in 21 years of consecutive imprisonment. In reality, the version of § 924(c) then in effect required a mandatory minimum of 57 years for those convictions alone.
The difference came from the statute’s former stacking provision, which required a seven-year sentence for the first firearm conviction and 25 years each for the second and third convictions, even when all three were obtained in the same prosecution.
Baker rejected the plea, went to trial, and was convicted on all six counts. The court imposed the mandatory 57 years for the firearm offenses, plus another 87 months for the bank robberies.
His total sentence was 64 years and three months.
At age 40, Baker faced the very real possibility of spending the rest of his life in federal prison. And according to his testimony, he did not learn about the mandatory 57-year sentence until he reviewed his presentence investigation report.
Why the Third Circuit Found Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a defendant generally must establish two things: that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and that the deficient performance caused prejudice.
The Third Circuit had little difficulty finding that Baker’s attorney performed deficiently. The § 924(c) stacking law was well established when she advised him about the plea agreement. Her failure to understand that law resulted in a sentencing miscalculation of more than three decades.
The more difficult question was prejudice.
Baker had to establish a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea agreement had his attorney properly explained the consequences of going to trial.
The district court rejected that argument, largely because Baker had maintained his innocence during the criminal proceedings and because the court questioned his credibility.
The Third Circuit disagreed.
The appellate court explained that the substantial difference between the sentence offered and the sentence actually imposed was important objective evidence supporting Baker’s claim. The difference was not a few months or even a few years. It was decades.
The court also rejected the district court’s heavy reliance on Baker’s claims of innocence. Defendants have a constitutional right to maintain their innocence, and statements made after rejecting a plea do not necessarily establish what they would have done if properly advised during negotiations.
Baker had also admitted his guilt privately to his attorney before trial, something his former attorney confirmed during the evidentiary hearing.
Considering the entire record, the Third Circuit found a reasonable probability that Baker would have accepted the original plea offer had he understood the mandatory sentence he faced.
What This Case Teaches Us About Winning § 2255 Motions
I’ve worked on federal postconviction cases for more than 17 years, and there are several important lessons in Baker that deserve attention.
1. The Facts Supporting the Claim Matter More Than the Legal Labels
Baker initially filed his § 2255 motion without an attorney. His original motion raised several ineffective assistance claims, but it did not specifically identify the critical error involving the § 924(c) stacking provision.
That issue emerged later, after appointed counsel became involved and further examined what happened during plea negotiations.
This distinction matters. Baker did not win merely because he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. He ultimately prevailed because the record established exactly what advice his attorney gave him, why that advice was wrong, and how it affected his decision.
His former attorney’s handwritten notes were particularly important. They documented the erroneous sentencing calculation and helped establish that the mistake actually occurred.
This is why I consistently warn people against relying on generic, fill-in-the-blank § 2255 motions. The court needs specific facts connecting counsel’s deficient performance to the claimed constitutional injury. Simply citing Strickland and saying your attorney was ineffective is not enough.
2. A Large Sentencing Disparity Can Be Powerful Evidence of Prejudice
One of the most useful aspects of Baker is the Third Circuit’s discussion of sentencing disparities.
The court recognized that determining whether a defendant would have accepted a rejected plea necessarily involves some speculation. After all, nobody can go back in time and observe what the defendant would have done with accurate information.
But the difference between the plea offer and the actual sentencing exposure provides an objective basis for evaluating that question.
In Baker’s case, the difference was enormous. The government offered an estimated 15-to-17-year sentence, while the defendant ultimately received more than 64 years.
The Third Circuit emphasized that this disparity strongly supported Baker’s testimony that he would have accepted the agreement had he understood his true exposure.
That does not mean every substantial sentencing disparity automatically establishes prejudice. The court expressly declined to adopt such a rule. But when combined with credible testimony and supporting evidence, a significant disparity can make an otherwise difficult IAC claim considerably stronger.
3. The Government’s Arguments Must Be Addressed Without Losing Sight of the Actual Claim
The government challenged Baker’s credibility and pointed to inconsistencies in his statements, his prior experience with the criminal justice system, and his decision to maintain his innocence.
The district court accepted enough of that reasoning to deny relief.
But the Third Circuit recognized that these issues did not adequately answer the central question: Would Baker have accepted the plea agreement if he had known that rejecting it exposed him to a mandatory 57-year firearm sentence?
This is an important lesson for anyone preparing a § 2255 motion or responding to the government’s opposition.
The government’s response may raise numerous arguments, but the reply must keep the court focused on the constitutional error, the evidence supporting it, and the applicable legal standard. Every factual dispute should be addressed in relation to the actual claim rather than allowing peripheral issues to overwhelm the analysis.
4. An Evidentiary Hearing Can Make the Difference
Baker’s case also demonstrates why evidentiary hearings are so important in postconviction litigation.
The district court heard testimony from Baker and his former attorney and admitted documentary evidence, including counsel’s handwritten notes from the plea negotiations.
That record gave the appellate court something concrete to evaluate. Without it, determining what Baker was told and how that advice affected his decision would have been considerably more difficult.
Under § 2255(b), an evidentiary hearing is generally required unless the motion and record conclusively establish that the prisoner is not entitled to relief.
But getting a hearing requires identifying material factual disputes that cannot be resolved from the existing record. Unsupported conclusions and generic allegations rarely accomplish that.
5. Getting a Certificate of Appealability Is a Separate Challenge
Even after losing his § 2255 motion, Baker received a certificate of appealability (COA) on the ineffective assistance claim involving the incorrect § 924(c) sentencing advice.
That allowed the Third Circuit to review the denial.
A COA is not automatic. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), a prisoner generally must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. When relief is denied on the merits, that ordinarily means showing that reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s resolution of the constitutional claim.
I’ve seen potentially legitimate postconviction issues go nowhere because the defendant failed to understand this additional procedural requirement.
A request for a COA needs to identify the specific constitutional issue and explain why the district court’s ruling is reasonably debatable. Simply repeating the arguments from the original § 2255 motion is often insufficient.
What Happened to Baker’s Sentence?
The Third Circuit reversed the denial of Baker’s ineffective assistance claim and ordered the government to reoffer the original plea agreement. Baker accepted the renewed offer, and the district court resentenced him to 194 months (16 years and 2 months) in prison, replacing his original sentence of more than 64 years.
Baker was released from the Bureau of Prisons in November 2024. His case is a powerful example of how a successful § 2255 motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations can dramatically change the outcome of a criminal case. What began as a 64-year prison sentence ultimately ended with Baker regaining his freedom.

Dale Chappell prepares people in sensitive, high-profile, and high-stakes federal cases for prison. He works with clients, families, and attorneys during pretrial, throughout incarceration, and during the transition to halfway house placement, home confinement, and supervised release.
Dale brings more than 17 years of experience, firsthand knowledge of the federal prison system, and experience testifying at high-profile public hearings on prison and criminal justice issues. He helps clients protect their safety and privacy, avoid decisions that can follow them throughout their sentences, and prepare for the strongest possible outcome at every stage.
Dale has written nearly 600 published articles on federal prison, post-conviction, and criminal justice issues.
Have questions?
Contact Dale directly at dale@facingfederalprison.com.


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