Calling defense counsel’s sentencing prediction “wildly different” from the actual sentence imposed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the denial of postconviction relief. It remanded for the district court to have the government reoffer the favorable plea deal the defendant rejected because of counsel’s bad advice about sentencing.
This case is a prime example of how significant disparities between a plea deal and the actual sentence can amount to a winnable IAC claim. Steven Baker was detained on January 26, 2010, and charged under 18 USC § 2113(d) for armed bank robbery and 18 USC § 924(c) for using a firearm during a crime of violence. He was offered a plea deal for the two charges with a total sentencing range of 168 to 189 months.
But counsel told him to reject the offer because he faced a bit more time if convicted at trial. As usual, the government piled on more charges that would force the court to impose a mandatory 57-year consecutive sentence under 924(c) to any sentence imposed for the bank robberies. He went to trial and lost, receiving the mandatory 57-year sentence plus 7 years for the bank robberies, or a total of 64 years. At age 40, Baker would be 95 when released.
On appeal, Baker challenged the evidence and trial errors but did not address the rejected plea offer or related sentencing issues. He lost the appeal. But then Baker filed a pro se motion under 28 USC § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). He argued that his lawyer failed to properly advise him about the favorable plea offer. The FPD was appointed, a supplemental motion was filed further supporting his claims and an evidentiary hearing was held.
Baker testified that his former counsel misinformed him about the sentencing exposure, advising him that each 924(c) conviction would run consecutively for a total of 21 years. This incorrect advice influenced Baker’s decision to go to trial, believing he had little to lose. The district court denied Baker’s motion, concluding that Baker’s insistence on his innocence showed a lack of prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, indicating he would not have accepted the plea even with proper advice.
On appeal, the Third Circuit focused on the “significant disparity” between the plea offer and the actual sentence as a key factor in determining prejudice under Strickland. The court emphasized that disparities in sentencing exposure are critical in assessing whether a defendant would have accepted a plea if not for counsel’s errors. This objective measure provides concrete evidence of the speculative nature of plea decision inquiries.
The Third Circuit noted that Baker’s willingness to admit guilt to his counsel before trial supported the probability that he would have accepted the plea deal if properly advised. The court also highlighted that defendants might maintain their innocence during proceedings based on legal strategy rather than actual guilt, which does not necessarily reflect their plea deliberations.
The court concluded that Baker had shown a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer if not for his counsel’s significant miscalculation of his sentence exposure. This miscalculation made his counsel’s performance constitutionally ineffective.
Here are some important points about this case. First, Baker’s pro se motion lacked enough facts to support his IAC claim about the rejected plea. It was a generic, cookie-cutter motion with his information plugged into certain places and some bare facts in support. He would have lost that claim if the FPD had not supplemented his motion. As I have said in the hundreds of articles I’ve written on postconviction relief, it’s all about the facts. Alleging enough facts is crucial to any IAC claim. The court only granted an evidentiary hearing after the FPD offered more facts to support the claim. The lack of facts is the biggest reason 2255 motions get denied.
Second, the district court merely followed the government’s response in its analysis of the claims. I read all the filings in this case, and the government did its best to misconstrue Baker’s claims into something they were not — and the court bought it. This is another common problem with 2255 motions. Once the court gets sidetracked by the government’s response, your reply must get the court back on track. The FPD did a good job with this in Baker’s case, but it wasn’t enough to avoid the denial of relief. The government’s twisted arguments swayed the district court.
Third, a certificate of appealability was granted on this plea offer claim. A 2255 appeal involves two steps: Getting the COA and then filing the formal appeal. Again, the FPD expertly convinced the court to grant a COA to appeal. Typically, courts deny a COA with boilerplate language, such as the movant failed to show the denial of a constitutional right. Knowing how to request a COA is critical. It is not the same as filing an appeal. It requires specific arguments, and most people miss that. This is why COAs are rarely granted.
You’ve heard me say it before, and I will continue to say it. Filing for 2255 relief is hard. There are many obstacles; failing to get around even one will doom your motion. If you can, get good help. You only get one good shot at 2255 relief.
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